Fordham Law Review
Volume 74

Issue 2

Article 12

2005

Policing the Spectrum Commons
Philip J. Weiser
Dale N. Hatfield

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Philip J. Weiser and Dale N. Hatfield, Policing the Spectrum Commons, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 663 (2005).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol74/iss2/12

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

Policing the Spectrum Commons
Cover Page Footnote
Associate Professor of Law and Telecommunications, University of Colorado. Thanks to Ellen Goodman,
Paul Margie, Patrick Ryan, and Doug Sicker for helpful comments and encouragement. Thanks, as well, to
the participants in the 2004 Telecommunications Policy Research Conference and the 2005 Fordham Law
and the Inforamtion Society Conference. *Adjunct Professor of Telecommunications, University of
Colorado.

This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol74/iss2/12

POLICING THE SPECTRUM COMMONS
PhilipJ. Weiser* and Dale N. Hatfield**
INTRODUCTION

Some of the bands of radio spectrum originally designed for unlicensed
uses (such as industrial operations) were widely regarded as "garbage
bands."' Many industry observers concluded that the assorted unlicensed
uses, in the band of frequencies around 2.4 gigahertz ("GHz"), for
example-mostly industrial, noncommunications uses like microwave
ovens--crowded that band sufficiently so that no reliable service could
operate in that range. 2 Undeterred by the crowded nature of that band, the
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers ("IEEE") developed a
standard for wireless broadband that would operate in the 2.4 GHz band of
spectrum. The subsequent success of the 802.11 standard, popularly known3
as Wi-Fi, has demonstrated that unlicensed spectrum can be big business.
In 2003 alone, for example, equipment manufacturers were expected to sell
more than $2.5 billion in Wi-Fi-related devices. 4 For 2004, it was
estimated that public Wi-Fi hot spots would reach "almost 140,000
worldwide, with some 30 million users." 5 To top it off, former Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") Chairman Michael Powell and
others have touted wireless broadband using unlicensed spectrum as a
broadband services to rural
financially viable approach for delivering
7
areas. 6 Not bad for a garbage band.
* Associate Professor of Law and Telecommunications, University of Colorado. Thanks to
Ellen Goodman, Paul Margie, Patrick Ryan, and Doug Sicker for helpful comments and
encouragement. Thanks, as well, to the participants in the 2004 Telecommunications Policy
Research Conference and the 2005 Fordham Law and the Information Society Conference.
** Adjunct Professor of Telecommunications, University of Colorado.
2004,
June
10,
Wi-Fi,
Economist.com,
Brief History
of
1. A
http://www.coe.montana.edu/ee/rwolff/EE580/history-of wifi.htm.
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Wiley Rein & Fielding LLP, Wi-Fi-802.1 1: The Shape of Things to Come
13-14 (2002), available at http://www.wrf.com/docs/publications/8422.pdf (discussing
projections for American and global Wi-Fi use).
Forecast,
Market
Corp.,
WiFi
Research
4. Insight
http://www.enterprisewirelesstechnology.com/page.cfn/link=62 (last visited Sept. 10, 2005).
2004,
June
8,
Buys,
Forbes.com,
Hutheesing,
Wi-Fi
5. Nikhil
http://www.forbes.com/wireless/2004/06/03/cz-nh-wifi04_buys.html.
6. See Michael K. Powell, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Address at WISPCON:
WISPs: Bringing the Benefits of Broadband to Rural America 1 (Oct. 27, 2004), available
at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC-253686AI.pdf (remarking that
formerly "junk" spectrum bands now host "wireless broadband networks that provide not
only last-mile connectivity, but last-30-50-mile connectivity"); Mingliu Zhang & Richard S.
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Wi-Fi's commercial success has raised a series of important questions for
policymakers and has forced the FCC to take seriously the promise of
technologies that use "commons access spectrum," such as the unlicensed
2.4 GHz band that facilitated the success of Wi-Fi. 8 First, advocates of a
"spectrum commons" are now pressing the FCC to make available
additional bands of commons access spectrum, including bands for a next
generation "WiMAX" technology. Second, Wi-Fi's success raises the
question of whether commons access spectrum can be used effectively to
provide commercial services, such as those now offered by "wireless
Internet Service Providers" ("WISPs"), which use commons access
spectrum to offer broadband services to customers. Third, as WISPs and
other firms using commons access spectrum begin to provide broadband
services (particularly in rural areas), the FCC is evaluating whether
commons access spectrum, as a common resource owned by no individual
firm, is prone to overuse and "tragedy of the commons"-type concerns. 9
Fourth, as the FCC adapts to the demands placed on it with respect to
commons access spectrum, it has begun to consider whether new models of
regulation are warranted, including how to address tragedy of the
commons-type concerns.
To date, proponents of increased commons access spectrum have not
developed careful solutions for ensuring that it can be used to provide
Wolff, Crossing the Digital Divide: Cost-Effective Broadband Wireless Access for Rural
and Remote Areas 7, http://www.coe.montana.edu/ee/rwolff/Divide-rev4.pdf (last visited
Sept. 7, 2004) (concluding that, based on "reasonable assumptions for equipment costs,
customer adoption rates, services prices and market share, a Wi-Fi-based broadband Internet
access network is financially viable in a rural area"); see also Stephen Lawson, Wi-Fi Brings
Broadband
to
Rural
Washington,
Infoworld,
Aug.
23,
2004,
http://www.infoworld.com/article/04/08/23/HNwifiwash_ .html (reporting on the use of the
Wi-Fi system in the 2.4 GHz band to provide wireless broadband service over a 3,700 square
mile area in rural Washington and estimating that 8000 such offerings exist throughout the
United States).
7. Notably, the 2.4 GHz band (along with other bands, such as the 900 MHz band)
supports an array of other unlicensed uses, ranging from cordless phones to garage door
openers. For purposes of this paper, however, we will focus on wireless broadband
applications. For a discussion of the array of uses of unlicensed spectrum, see Kenneth R.
Carter et al., Unlicensed and Unshackled: A Joint OSP-OET White Paper on Unlicensed
Devices and Their RegulatoryIssues (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, OSP Working Paper Series,
Paper No. 39, 2003), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DOC234741A1.pdf.
8. In general, we use the term "commons access spectrum" interchangeably with
"unlicensed spectrum." There are, however, alternative licensing arrangements-i.e.,
licensing widespread spectrum access by rule or providing members of the public with
"nonexclusive licenses"-that afford parties access to spectrum in a very similar manner to
unlicensed spectrum. To encompass this broader concept, we use the term "commons access
spectrum" to refer to all spectrum bands that are open to public use (or at least to categories
of the public). Moreover, some commentators refer to "open spectrum" or "open access
spectrum," but we prefer using the commons concept to underscore that "commons access
spectrum" may include certain restrictions, whereas open access generally suggests
unrestricted access.
9. For a discussion of the "tragedy of the commons" concern, see infra notes 50-51 and
accompanying text.
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commercial services without confronting tragedy of the commons-like
concerns. 10 At best, they have suggested that social norms, cooperation in
the development of the relevant protocols (through standard-setting bodies
like the IEEE) or the FCC's current regime for certifying technologiesI
(through its Part 15 rules) can prevent such problems from emerging."
Those who are more mindful of the need to guard against behavior that
would undermine the viability of such services have suggested that
common law courts can adjudicate tort actions to police the use of
commons access spectrum. 12 Yet others have suggested that local property
owners should be permitted to manage commons access spectrum on their
premises 13 or that the FCC should establish certain etiquette standards (the
equivalent of "don't speak unless you have something to say, don't
interrupt, and don't speak more loudly than necessary to be heard") to
prevent tragedy of the commons-like concerns. 14 In all events, however,
at all-to regulate access to the spectrum commons
the debate over how-if
15
is only beginning.
This Article both underscores the imperative of, and presents an
analytical framework for, regulating the use of commons access spectrum.
In particular, it rejects the argument made by many spectrum commons
advocates that commons access spectrum can prosper without any FCC
10. Yochai Benkler, a leading advocate of a spectrum commons approach, readily
acknowledges that the identification of the content and form of those rules that will most
effectively address tragedy of the commons-like concerns constitutes "an important area of
study" that must still be addressed. Yochai Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building
the Commons of the Digitally Networked Environment, 11 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 287, 361-62
(1998); see also Stuart Buck, Replacing Spectrum Auctions with a Spectrum Commons, 2002
39,
2,
L.
Rev.
Tech.
Stan.
http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/02_STLR_2/articlepdf.pdf (noting that Benkler's
advocacy of a spectrum commons is not coupled with a description "in any great detail" of
the measures necessary to make it work).
40-41.
11. See Buck, supra note 10,
12. See, e.g., Kevin Werbach, Supercommons: Toward a Unified Theory of Wireless
Communication, 82 Tex. L. Rev. 863, 931 (2004) ("Conflicts among users of wireless
devices should be addressed through a 'negative' regime of tort .... ).
13. See Thomas Hazlett, Missing the Next (Radio) Wave, Barrons, Aug. 2, 2004,
http://www.manhattan-institute.org/html/_barrons-missingthe-next.htm.
14. Fed. Commc'n Comm'n, Comments of Microsoft Corp., Modification of Parts 2 and
15 of the Commission's Rules for Unlicensed Devices and Equipment Approval, ET Docket
No. 03-201, at 5 (2004) [hereinafter Comments of Microsoft] (on file with author).
15. We note that there are two other forms of spectrum commons that we will not
address explicitly in this paper, although those contexts raise some related issues to the ones
we address here. In particular, the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") has
begun to consider whether to make available "spectrum underlays" within licensed bands
(such as those made available for ultra-wideband technology) and whether to authorize
opportunistic uses of otherwise licensed spectrum not being used by the licensee at a
particular time. See Facilitating Opportunities for Flexible, Efficient, and Reliable Spectrum
Use Employing Cognitive Radio Technologies, 18 F.C.C.R. 26,859, 26,869-70 (2003)
(notice of proposed rulemaking and order) (inquiring into possible uses of cognitive radios to
facilitate opportunistic uses of licensed spectrum); Revision of Part 15 of the Commission's
Rules Regarding Ultra-Wideband Transmission Systems, 17 F.C.C.R. 7435 (2002) (first
report and order) (authorizing underlays for ultra-wideband). Similarly, we do not discuss
the issues raised by "private commons" that are managed by a firm with a spectrum license.
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oversight, arguing instead that the FCC should develop a regulatory
program that integrates the efforts of end-user groups, interested companies,
16
private standard-setting bodies, and its own enforcement tools.
Historically speaking, the FCC's strategy for enforcing limits on the uses of
commons access spectrum has focused on equipment certification
requirements, specialized rules of operation, and in some rare cases,
penalizing those who use spectrum illegally. 17 But where standards are
increasingly embedded in software and users are not easily identified, this
approach needs to be refined.
In short, we focus on two central reforms: developing additional
proactive measures to limit the potential for interference and improving the
FCC's system of back-end enforcement. To set the stage for these reforms,
Part I outlines the basics of the current spectrum management regime, and
Part II discusses the alternative possible approaches-i.e., other than public
regulation-for policing commons access spectrum. In recommending
regulation of commons access spectrum in Part III, we recognize that the
measures we propose will require considerable effort to implement, but we
believe that a failure to address these issues would be the Achilles' heel of
the commons model of spectrum management. At the same time, we
recognize that if the FCC institutes overly restrictive regulations of
commons access spectrum, it risks sacrificing some of the benefits of such
spectrum by allowing it to fall prey to some of the failings of the legacy
command-and-control model.
I. THE RADIO SPECTRUM AND THE CURRENT SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT
REGIME

To understand the issues raised by the debate over how to police the
spectrum commons, we must first outline the structure of the current
regulatory system. Part of the challenge facing the FCC as it seeks to adapt
to the changing technologies that make possible more efficient uses of
spectrum is both that its statutory authority is antiquated, dating back to the
1930s, and that reforming regulation invariably threatens incumbent
interests. Before we can explain the current regulatory model, however, we
must first explain what the "radio spectrum" is.
A. A Succinct Primeron Spectrum Technology
The radio spectrum refers to electromagnetic waves that travel through
space within a frequency range of 3000 cycles-per-second and 400 billion
cycles-per-second. These "frequencies," which are measured in Hertz and
abbreviated as "Hz," form the basis of wireless communications. In
16. In this sense, we build on some of the conclusions offered by Ellen Goodman. See
Ellen P. Goodman, Spectrum Rights in the Telecosm to Come, 41 San Diego L. Rev. 269,

403-04 (2004) (calling for greater development of the necessary regulatory strategy to
facilitate the effective use of commons spectrum).
17. See discussion infra Part I.B.
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particular, a given range of frequencies can be used to communicate
information over distances without wires or other physical media. In the
case of analog cellular services, for example, a voice channel of 30,000 Hz
(or 30 kiloHz, or kHz) can provide sufficient bandwidth to establish a
reliable communications link. 18 Significantly, a provider can use a
particular 30 kHZ channel to provide analog cellular service on one day and
then still have the same amount of radio spectrum available for use
tomorrow, meaning that spectrum is infinitely renewable. 19
The radio spectrum can be divided up along the lines of its frequency,
time, and space dimensions. In theory at least, additional users of spectrum
can always be accommodated-particularly through the use of smart
"cognitive radio" technologies, discussed below, that enable enormous
flexibility in spectrum use. 20
But even taking advantage of such
technologies, there are practical considerations in terms of cost and
complexity that limit the number of users that can be served in a given
geographic area at one time and, in that sense, the radio spectrum is a scarce
resource. Thus, despite being infinitely renewable, spectrum often has
significant economic value, especially in geographic areas with intense
demand for wireless communications.
When commentators discuss the radio spectrum, they generally focus on
the set of frequencies that are most suitable for commercial uses.
Significantly, because different frequency ranges ("bands") within the radio
spectrum have different technical characteristics, some bands are more
attractive for particular purposes than others. The most notable uses of
spectrum rely on the frequencies between 300 MHz and 3 GHz because the
physical dimensions of the required antennas are reasonable, the associated
transmitting and receiving devices are less costly, and more fundamentally,
the radio waves are less susceptible to being blocked or weakened by
natural or man-made obstacles such as hilly terrain or tall buildings.
Technological change can overcome such obstacles, however, and the range
of usable spectrum has expanded over time.
The term "spectrum management" generally refers to the broad array of
activities associated with the regulation of this somewhat unusual natural
resource. In short, it includes activities such as (1) allocating bands of
frequencies for certain purposes (e.g., television broadcasting, terrestrial
mobile radio services, or unlicensed spectrum not designated for a
18. One KHz is one thousand Hz, one MHz is one million Hz, and one GHz is one
billion Hz.
Historically, the greater number of frequencies used for a particular
communications link correlated with greater power levels and increased bandwidth.
Accordingly, a transmission for a broadcast television station uses 6 MHz, or 200 times as
much bandwidth as an analog cellular voice channel. As we discuss below, new digital
technologies have begun to undermine these historic patterns of spectrum usage.
19. Like air or water, however, the radio spectrum resource can be "polluted" by
interference generated by natural sources of electromagnetic waves (e.g., lightning strokes)
or by spurious emissions from radio transmitters or other man-made devices (e.g., florescent
lights).
20. See infra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
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particular use); (2) assigning licenses that authorize individuals or firms to
use particular bands of spectrum (e.g., through an auction process); (3)
developing the rules and regulations (e.g., maximum transmitter power) that
govern the use of a channel or group of channels within a band in a
specified geographical area; and (4) enforcing the associated rules and
regulations once they are adopted. 2 1 As explained at the outset, spectrum
commons advocates generally focus on the first two functions-i.e.,
allocation and assignment-and downplay or ignore the issues associated
with the last two-i.e., service rules and enforcement.
B. The FCC's Spectrum ManagementRegime
In 1934, when Congress created the FCC (in the Communications Act of
193422) and instituted an approach for regulating access to the radio
spectrum, the concept of "spectrum management" was generally limited to
the role of overseeing the licenses to operate broadcast stations (initially for
radio and later for television).2 3 But over seventy years later, the
importance of wireless technologies that use the spectrum-and the FCC's
management of that resource-goes well beyond what Congress envisioned
in 1934. Unfortunately, the 1934 Act continues to form the basis of
spectrum policy, as the FCC continues to use the generations old
"command-and-control" model of regulation that tightly prescribes what
users can and cannot do with a spectrum license.
Under the legacy command-and-control model, companies live and die
by the FCC's decisions regarding the utilization of spectrum.
Consequently, the allocation of spectrum for particular uses and the FCC's
development of specific technical and service rules governing those
allocations are crucial determinants of industry structure and performance.
In the mobile telephone industry, for example, the FCC initially allocated
only enough spectrum for two operators in each geographic area and it
generally restricted the uses permitted under other spectrum licenses so that
the bands not previously designated for mobile telephony could not be used
to compete against the two authorized providers. 24 In such an environment,
innovation in wireless technologies is inhibited, as FCC Chairman Powell
put it in 2002, "by the 'mother may I' phenomenon-businesses must go to
the FCC for permission before they can modify their spectrum plans to
respond to consumer demand. ' '2 5

21. For an in-depth discussion of these functions, see Jonathan E. Nuechterlein & Philip
J. Weiser, Digital Crossroads: American Telecommunications Policy in the Internet Age
231-39 (2005) rhereinafter Digital Crossroads].
22. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-615 (2000).
23. The Communications Act of 1934 instructed the Federal Communications
Commission to grant broadcast licenses to advance "the public interest, convenience, and
necessity." Id.§ 309(a).
24. See Digital Crossroads, supra note 21, at 268.
25. Michael K. Powell, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns. Comm'n, Address at University of
Colorado at Boulder, Silicon Flatirons Telecommunications Program: Broadband Migration
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Over the last fifty years, as firms increasingly sought access to spectrum
to provide new services, the command-and-control model came under
increasing criticism. Traditionally, the FCC made spectrum available by
reallocating spectrum from lower-value to higher-value uses. Using this
technique, the FCC follows the ."wise man theory' of regulation," under
which it is deemed "capable of deciding what [uses of spectrum are] best
for the public." 26 The FCC, for example, has long reserved wide swaths of
spectrum for use by the broadcasters (including the often underused UHF
frequencies), even while mobile telephone operators clamored for more
spectrum. The reason for the FCC's limited success in reallocating
spectrum already designated for particular uses is readily understandable:
Few incumbent licensees will give up an entitlement to use spectrum
without getting something in return. To use the economic term, the fight
among incumbent and potential users of spectrum is a form of rent
seeking-in that spectrum licensees (and would-be licensees) press
vigorously for regulatory decisions that give rise to economic rents for
27
themselves.
The limitations of the command-and-control model have long troubled
observers of the FCC's spectrum management regime. In particular, Nobel
Laureate Ronald Coase observed in the 1950s that the FCC's commandand-control regulation of spectrum prevented numerous "win-win" trades
from taking place. 28 Notably, if the FCC allowed incumbent licenseessuch as UHF broadcasters-to sell or lease their spectrum licenses free of
any use restrictions, more productive users of the spectrum-say, mobile
telephone operators--could purchase those licenses and thereby enhance
consumer welfare. Indeed, from the 1950s until the 1990s, the FCC's
failure to embrace this "property rights" model gave rise to a cottage
industry of scholarship that castigated the agency for its misdirected
regulation of spectrum. 29 As the next section makes clear, however, the
FCC has not only begun to act on such proposals, it also has begun to
consider other fundamental reforms of its traditional spectrum management
regime.

III:

New

Directions

in

Wireless

Policy

(Oct.

30,

2002),

available

at

http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Powell/2002/spmkp212.html.
26. Douglas W. Webbink, Frequency Spectrum Deregulation Alternatives 10 (Fed.
Commc'ns
Comm'n,
Working
Paper
No.
2,
1980),
available
at

http:/www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp2.pdf (emphasis omitted).
27. For a discussion of the rent-seeking aspects of spectrum regulation, see generally
Thomas W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the Spectrum
Auction Faux Pas, and the Punchline to Ronald Coase's "Big Joke ": An Essay on Airwave

Allocation Policy, 14 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 335 (2001).
28. See R.H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & Econ. 1, 17-40
(1959).
29. See Goodman, supra note 16, at 271 n.3 (listing property rights advocates).
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C. Beyond Command and Control and the Commons Model
Over forty years after Coase first argued for it, the FCC began to reform
its traditional spectrum management regime and to treat licenses in a more
property-like manner. In particular, the FCC began to heed the calls for
reform in the early 1990s and, following the congressional directive to use
auctions to assign spectrum licensees, the agency has embarked on a
number of initiatives to move spectrum policy towards a property rights
model. 30 The FCC's recent Spectrum Policy Task Force Report developed
the case for using a property rights model, 3 1 and the FCC has since
followed up this rhetoric with a secondary markets initiative. 32 . To date,
however, proposed market-based reforms have confronted a series of
obstacles, many of which relate to the difficult question of how to transition
from the command-and-control regime to a market-based framework.
Notably, policymakers continue to debate whether (1) to allow incumbent
licensees additional freedom to sell or lease their rights to others who place
a greater value on the spectrum, or (2) to prevent incumbent providers from
reaping "windfalls" from the enhanced value of the additional flexibility, at
the risk of allowing those incumbents to maintain their grip on their
33
spectrum.
Around the same time that the FCC initiated a number of market-based
reforms, a notable list of commentators, including Internet pioneer David
Reed and law professors Yochai Benkler and Lawrence Lessig, began
arguing for a model of spectrum management based on treating spectrum as
a "commons." 34 Under this model, which builds off of the FCC's
reservation of swaths of spectrum as unlicensed (such as the 2.4 GHz band),
anyone can gain access to a block of spectrum or set of channels, subject to
certain basic rules. 35 Such a "spectrum commons" approach is somewhat
analogous to grazing lands that are used in common by herdsmen in a
community, or to public parks or hunting lands that can be accessed by
30. See Digital Crossroads, supra note 21, at 242-51.
31. See Spectrum Policy Task Force, Fed. Commc'ns. Comm'n, Spectrum Policy Task
Force Report (2002), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC228542Al.pdf.
32. See Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum Through Elimination of Barriers to the
Development of Secondary Markets, 18 F.C.C.R. 20,604 (2003).
33. For a discussion of the transitional challenges in moving toward the property rights
model, see Digital Crossroads, supra note 21, at 245-51. See also Evan Kwerel & John
Williams, A Proposalfor a Rapid Transition to Market Allocation of Spectrum, at iv-v (Fed.
Commc'ns. Comm'n, OSP Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 38, 2002), available
at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-228552A 1.pdf; Gerald R.
Faulhaber & David Farber, Spectrum Management: Property Rights, Markets, and the
Commons,
http://rider.wharton.upenn.edu/-faulhabe/SPECTRUM_
MANAGEMENTv51 .pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2005).
34. For an early articulation of this position, see generally Benkler, supra note 10. For
later ones, see Lawrence Lessig, The Future of Ideas 219-23 (2001); David P. Reed, Why
Spectrum Is Not Property: The Case for an Entirely New Regime of Wireless
Communications
Policy,
Reed's
Locus,
Feb
27,
2001,
http://www.reed.com/dprframeweb/dprframe.asp?section=paper&fn=openspec.html (draft).
35. See Digital Crossroads, supra note 21, at 251-57.
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anyone. By pushing for such a model of spectrum management, commons
advocates have joined forces with property rights advocates in criticizing
the command-and-control model, but have advocated a different approach
for addressing the rigidities and inefficiencies of the legacy system.
In advocating for a commons model, many commentators highlight the
increasing significance of digital technologies that use spectrum efficiently
and avoid interference in ways that earlier, "dumb" radios could not. Two
notable examples of such technologies are "spread spectrum" and
"cognitive radios," both of which can be used to avoid creating large "white
spaces" (i.e., unused or underused bands) in the spectrum. Spread spectrum
employs digital technologies to spread signals over a wide band of
spectrum, sometimes enabling the signals to avoid particular channels
depending on which frequencies are being used. 36 Cognitive radios are a
distinct innovation that may or may not be used in conjunction with spread
spectrum. Such radios enable users to manipulate transmission devices-or
for devices to be programmed to self-adjust-so that they can operate using
various frequencies, power levels, modulation techniques, or transmission
formats. 37 Significantly, such radios are generally defined and controlled
by software (i.e., "software-defined radios") as opposed to the traditional
38
hardware-based (and "hard-wired") radios.
In arguing for increased swaths of commons access spectrum, commons
39
model advocates point to the success of devices using the 2.4 GHz band.
Like the 2.4 GHz band, a block of spectrum can be designated as commons
access spectrum so that any member of the public can use it. Unlike
spectrum regulated under the command-and-control or property rights
model, however, users of commons access spectrum have no assurance
against interference from other such users. Moreover, users of commons
access spectrum must comply with specified technical standards (e.g.,
maximum power restrictions) and, in some cases, specialized requirements
(e.g., do not transmit on a particular channel if you detect that it is already
in use). Such requirements are set forth in the FCC's Part 15 rules, 40 which
are generally enforced through a certification regime that calls for
manufacturers to demonstrate that their device (say, a baby monitor,
cordless phone, or garage door opener) adheres to the relevant
36. The two most common types of spread spectrum, direct sequence spread spectrum
and frequency-hopping spread spectrum, both involve the widening of the basic signal and
fall within the FCC's definition of the term. See 47 C.F.R. § 2.1 (2004).
37. See generally Facilitating Opportunities for Flexible, Efficient, and Reliable
Spectrum Use Employing Cognitive Radio Technologies, 18 F.C.C.R. 26,859 (2003) (notice
of proposed rule-making and order).
38. The FCC recognized the development of software-defined radios and set forth a
certification policy for them in Authorization and Use of Software Defined Radios, 16
F.C.C.R. 17,373 (2001) (first report and order). Although software-defined radios are often
described as a type of a cognitive radio, there are some software-defined radios that, as a
technical matter, are not cognitive. In any event, a more in-depth discussion of this issue is
beyond the scope of this Article.
39. See A BriefHistory of Wi-Fi, supra note 1.
40. See 47 C.F.R. § 15 (2004).
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requirements. Finally, the Part 15 rules mandate that any unlicensed
device
41
cease operating if it causes interference to its licensed counterparts.
The traditional Part 15 regime, which governs the use of unlicensed
devices, is a paradigm of regulatory minimalism. The central goal of this
regime is to enable users of unlicensed spectrum to operate without causing
harmful interference to licensed uses. Traditionally, the Part 15 rules have
regulated the permissible power levels of any authorized device 4 2 and have
assigned liability to manufacturers for failing to follow the applicable
certification requirements. 43 In a notable revision of these rules in the late
1980s and early 1990s, the FCC raised the power level requirements in
order to facilitate the use of spread spectrum technology in certain
unlicensed bands and added additional bands for unlicensed uses. 44 In
addition to spurring the development of more sophisticated cordless
telephones, these decisions also set the stage for the explosive growth of
Wi-Fi systems.
The successful deployment of Wi-Fi systems for the 2.4 GHz band
reflects a virtuous cycle that continues to drive adoption of the technology.
In particular, with the initial Wi-Fi standards in place and the continuing
rapid growth and falling prices of the necessary equipment, entrepreneurs
have recognized an opportunity to offer broadband access to the general
public through wireless access points located at high-traffic volume
locations such as airports and other transportation hubs, hotel lobbies, and
coffee shops. Sometimes the access is offered for free as a way of
attracting customers to the location (e.g., the coffee shop) or in exchange
for a one-time charge or a longer term subscription. In addition, WISPs and
other entrepreneurs have recognized the possibility of using very similar
technology to extend broadband Internet access to homes or small
businesses that were not able to get DSL or cable modem service via wired
facilities. For example, a WISP in a small farming community might install
an access point with a relatively sophisticated antenna on a high structure
such as a water tower and thereby offer high-speed Internet access to an
entire cluster of homes and small businesses. Because only the use of
widely available and competitively priced equipment-and no radio
license-is required, these WISPs can roll out service quickly and at low
cost. Various manufacturers have recognized this as a potentially large
market and have developed even more sophisticated, "carrier-class"
systems that operate over an extended range using commons access
spectrum.
41. Id. § 15.5(c).
42. See Goodman, supra note 16, at 288 n.63.
43. See, e.g., Datel Design & Dev., Inc., 19 F.C.C.R. 17, 20 (2004) (notice of apparent
liability) (fining Datel Design and Development $10,000 for importing equipment that
radiated emissions beyond that authorized by the Part 15 rules).
44. See, e.g., Revision of Part 15 of the Rules Regarding the Operation of Radio
Frequency Devices Without an Individual License, 4 F.C.C.R. 3493, 3516 (1989) (first
report and order).
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Commons advocates point to the spectacular success of Wi-Fi as a
harbinger of what can be expected under a commons model of spectrum
management. In particular, they argue that the technical architecture of
technologies using commons access spectrum can promote innovation far
more rapidly than spectrum subject to the traditional command-and-control
or even the property rights model of spectrum management. 4 5 To do so,
they point to the Internet's architecture as a model for spectrum
management, highlighting that in the Internet environment, anyone can
create a new service by installing software residing in computers (e.g., in
clients and servers) external to the "dumb" portion of the network
controlled by the carrier or provider. Indeed, the most popular applications
that have driven the success of the Internet-email, the Worldwide Web,
Instant Messaging, and filesharing to name just the most prominent-have
evolved in exactly this way. 46 In short, not only do spectrum commons
advocates suggest using decentralized intelligence to dramatically increase
the efficient use of spectrum (through shared access based on new
technologies), but they also envision it as a way of shifting greater control
over service development (as well as content creation, distribution, and
consumption decisions) to the general public.
When the FCC reserved spectrum at 2.4 GHz for unlicensed uses, it had
no idea that such spectrum would facilitate wireless broadband applications
like Wi-Fi. During ongoing spectrum policy debates, however, there is a
widespread awareness that the FCC's decisions about making available
more commons access spectrum (i.e., whether as unlicensed, licensed to a
class of users by rule, or available to all under a nonexclusive license) could
spur increased broadband connectivity. Thus, while the initial success of
the spectrum commons approach largely reflected a happy historical
accident, it has birthed a model of spectrum management which has
warranted a closer look from policymakers. The FCC's Spectrum Policy
Task Force Report, for example, recognized the commons model as a peer
to the property rights model-a model which had long been the sole rival to
the traditional command-and-control approach. 47 Additionally, major
information technology companies like Intel have picked up the mantle of
arguing for increased commons access spectrum, advocating, for example,
that the FCC designate frequencies in the 700 MHz range-now used by

45. See Yochai Benkler, Some Economics of Wireless Communications, 16 Harv. J.L.
& Tech. 25, 72-73 (2002).
46. As Andrew Odlyzko has observed, "In spite of many attempts, the established
service providers and their suppliers have an abysmal record in innovation in user
services.... The real 'killer apps,' such as email, the Web, browsers, search engines, IM,
and Napster, have all come from users." Andrew Odlyzko, Telecom Dogmas and Spectrum
Allocations 7 (2004), available at http://wirelessunleashed.com/papers/TelecomDogmas.pdf.

47. See Principles for Promoting Efficient Use of Spectrum by Encouraging the
Development of Secondary Markets, 15 F.C.C.R. 24,178, 24,180 (2000) (policy statement)
("[T]he best way to realize the maximum benefits from the spectrum is to permit and
promote the operation of market forces in determining how spectrum is used.").
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UHF stations-as unlicensed spectrum. 4 8 Indeed, the FCC has recognized
that WISPs would use additional unlicensed spectrum at higher power
levels to enable them to provide "broadband access networks serving
'49
individual customers in sparsely populated areas."
At present, the FCC has only begun to recognize that it may need to
reform its regulation of commons access spectrum to protect commons
access users from interfering with one another. As commercial providers
like WISPs increasingly offer services using commons access spectrum,
however, the FCC will need to take seriously the argument that the
commons model of spectrum management-at least without additional
regulatory oversight-will give rise to the famed "tragedy of the
commons." 50 On this argument, a resource that is designated for common
usage is prone to despoliation as individual users increase their
consumption of the resource without taking care to ensure that they do not
overuse the resource. 51 In the spectrum context, a notable concern is that
users of commons access spectrum will increase the performance of
communications links by increasing their transmitter power, but at the
expense of causing more interference to-and reducing the performance
of-links operated by other users. Faced with diminished performance,
other users will then retaliate by raising their own transmitter power to
compensate for the increased interference. With this concern in mind, the
FCC should examine how to prevent such vicious cycles before fully
embracing the commons model of spectrum management.
II.

ENSURING A SUSTAINABLE SPECTRUM COMMONS

The regulatory debate over whether a spectrum commons can avoid
tragedy of the commons-type concerns is in its infancy, with commentators
only beginning to address this question. The resolution of the issue will
depend on whether some form of regulation can prevent users of commons
access spectrum from descending into mutually antagonistic forms of
behavior. Notably, regulation can take a variety of forms, including (1)
social norms that limit certain types of behavior, (2) market ordering that
creates incentives for and against certain types of behavior, (3) technical
architectures that limit the range of possible behavior, and (4) traditional
law enforcement that punishes certain types of behavior. 52 In general,
commons advocates focus on some combination of the first three modes of
regulation, often contending that FCC regulation is unnecessary or only
48. Michael Singer, Intel: Specirum Is the New Frontier,intemetnews.com, July 30,
2004, http://www.intemetnews.com/wireless/article.php/3388811.
49. Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Begins Rulemaking Proposing to
Allow Wireless Broadband Operations in the 3650-3700 MHz Band (Apr. 15, 2004),
available at 2004 WL 828417.

50. See Stuart Minor Benjamin, Spectrum Abundance and the Choice Between Private
and Public Control, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2007, 2031 (2003).
51. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968).
52. See generally Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. Legal Stud. 661
(1998).
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minimally necessary to enable the commons model of spectrum
management to succeed. To evaluate this claim, we consider each of the
first three modes in turn and then judge whether they prevented tragedy of
the commons-type concerns in analogous, commons-like environments:
"ham radio" (formally known as the amateur radio service) and citizen's
band ("CB") spectrums.
A. Social Norms
The importance of social norms as a form of regulating the use of
commons access spectrum is potentially enormous.
For years,
commentators often invoked the tragedy of the commons concern 53 but did
so without investigating whether actual commons uses gave rise to such
concerns. Recent scholarship has reversed this trend, suggesting that
commons regimes can operate effectively under certain circumstances. In
particular, Robert Ellickson famously observed that ranchers in Shasta
County settled disputes with one another through a series of social norms
about how to use common property--even in the absence of formal legal
54
rules to govern their behavior.
To explain the collaboration necessary to maintain a commons, students
of game theory have advanced the argument that participants act very
differently-and are far more likely to cooperate-when engaged in a
repeat playing game. In such games, participants may well realize that if
they deviate from a norm of cooperation in one instance, it might well come
back to haunt them in another one.5 5 Indeed, in some communitieswhether neighboring ranchers or particular industries-the resort to legal
formalities and self-interested behavior is unlikely to be constructive; as
Stewart Macaulay quoted a purchasing sales agent over forty years ago,
"'You don't read legalistic contract clauses at each other if you ever want to
do business again.' ' 56 Not surprisingly, Macaulay's landmark study of
business relations found that the most common type of dispute to end up in

53. For the classic example of such an argument, see Mancur Olson, The Logic of
Collective Action 2 (1965) (arguing that "rational, self-interested individuals will not act to
achieve their common or group interests"). To be sure, Olson did not discuss the tragedy of
the commons concern per se, but rather the closely associated "free rider problem," whereby
individuals decline to take any action that would advance the collective interest. On this
account, individuals only safeguard their narrow self interest, which means that any
collective action issues-such as maintaining common property-are unlikely to be
addressed effectively. See id.
54. Robert C. Ellickson, Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes (1991).
55. See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation 73-87 (1984) (discussing the role
of reciprocity in fostering cooperation between opposing units entrenched a short distance
away from one another during World War I); David Hirshleifer & Eric Rasmusen,
Cooperation in a Repeated Prisoners'Dilemmawith Ostracism, 12 J. Econ. Behav. & Org.
87, 90-94 (1989) (discussing the role of reciprocity in establishing equilibrium among
multiple players in different games involving repeated interactions).
56. Stewart Macaulay, Non-ContractualRelations in Business: A PreliminaryStudy, 28
Am. Soc. Rev. 55, 61 (1963).
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an appellate court is a fight over the ending of a business relationship-i.e.,
57
an action for the wrongful termination of a franchise agreement.
In short, the game theory literature suggests that social norms which
address and prevent counterproductive behavior may well arise in repeat
games situations, but there are no such guarantees where the parties are not
likely to interact with one another on a regular basis. 58 Relatedly, in
environments where a firm cares about its reputation, that concern can
discourage tragedy of the commons-like behavior. 59 Consequently, the
combination of repeated interactions between parties and widespread
reputation effects can help to explain how certain markets, such as diamond
trading, are characterized by a remarkable degree of trust and a commitment
by firms not to press their legal rights to the hilt.60 Nonetheless, as Paul
Mahoney and Chris Sanchirico convincingly explain, it is quite possible
that even reputational sanctions in contexts with multiple players will fail to
61
ensure that benevolent norms are followed and noncompliance punished.
Finally, in situations where reputational sanctions are not available (i.e.,
where the parties do not know one another), it is quite likely that only legal
62
enforcement can ensure that individuals follow the relevant social norms.
In the wireless context, the significance of social norms is readily
apparent. Two next-door neighbors, for example, can often resolve
57. Id. at 65.
58. See Eric A. Posner, The Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal andNonlegal
Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 133, 137-44 (1996). There are still
important unanswered questions about how social norms work in practice, including how
they are developed, how quickly they adapt to serve their purpose, and how they are
enforced, but we can assume for our purposes that such norms are reasonably effective in
regulating behavior under certain conditions. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Origin,
Development, andRegulation of Norms, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 338, 352 (1997) (highlighting how
the effort necessary to enforce social norms presents a collective action problem in and of
itself).
59. See Jason Scott Johnston, The Statute of Fraudsand Business Norms: A Testable
Game-Theoretic Model, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1859, 1874-75 (1996) ("Within suitably dense
and homogenous communities, the harm to the breacher's reputation and lost future dealings
with third parties that she will suffer when the aggrieved party tells others in the community
about her breach may supplant the 'second party' sanction of relationship termination.");
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract, 26 J.L. & Econ. 691,
699 (1983) ("[I]n simple worlds with reputations, the rule of law does not matter.").
60. See Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual
Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. Legal Stud. 115, 126-28 (1992). Bernstein notes
that the substantive rules of arbitration to which New York diamond dealers voluntarily
submit are based upon trade usage and custom rather than state contract law, and that a
dealer who refuses to be bound by an arbitration ruling risks severe reputational damage if
the claimant must resort to state court for enforcement of the ruling. Id; see also Lisa
Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code's Searchfor Immanent
Business Norms, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1765, 1799-1800 (1996).
61. Paul G. Mahoney & Chris William Sanchirico, Norms, Repeated Games, and the
Role of Law, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1281, 1294-95 (2003) (discussing enforcement problems that
occur when more than two actors are involved).
62. See Robert E. Scott, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements, 103 Column.
L. Rev. 1641, 1644, 1647 (2003) (noting that conditions of repeat playing games and
significant reputation effects are "stringent," and when those conditions are not met, "legal
enforcement is necessary").
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interference issues amicably and effectively, often by repositioning their
antennas.
Similarly, equipment manufacturers
who produce
complementary equipment (say, related Wi-Fi devices) have strong
incentives both to minimize interference with one another's equipment and
to enable users to identify which users are degrading one another's uses of
commons access spectrum. Moving to the analogy of the public park, the
role of social norms can be quite powerful where local neighbors know who
does and who does not follow certain established social norms (say,
cleaning up after one's dog). 6 3 Indeed, social sanctions-be they collective
shunning or "tit for tat" behaviors (say, not cleaning up after one's dog on a
neighbor's property)-can be a remarkably effective means of encouraging
compliance with a social norm.
In some wireless environments, there are reports that both users of WiFi-like services and of air-to-ground radio channels-i.e., in contexts of
limited numbers of users who know one another-have worked with one
another constructively to avoid interference. 64 But when anonymous users
send signals that travel great distances in dense areas, there are strong
reasons to believe that social norms will break down. Similarly, when only
small communities of individuals used the Internet to communicate with
one another, "Netiquette" was a plausible (if unlikely) means of curbing
spam; in today's Internet environment, however, social norms about email
usage no longer are suggested as means of stemming the tide of span. 65 In
short, effective enforcement of property rights (including the right to use a
commons reasonably) is a public good (e.g., everyone benefits from the
deterrent effect of criminalizing trespassing) that the marketplace does not
provide. In recognition of this point, the state should provide an effective
regime to enforce property rights in most cases (i.e., at least where social
norms will not operate effectively to do So).66
B. Free-MarketSolutions
For many Internet-age problems like spare, some commentators argue
that free-market solutions can solve collective challenges and obviate the
need for public regulation. 67 More generally, some commentators argue
that "[c]ompetitive private institutions offer the potential for the
63. Elinor Ostrom, Governing The Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for
Collective Action 136, 138-39 (1990).
64. See
Wireless
BANC:
Broadband
Access
Network
Coordination,
http://www.wbanc.com (last visited Sept. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Wireless BANC].
65. Paul K. Ohm, On Regulating the Internet: Usenet, a Case Study, 46 UCLA L. Rev.
1941, 1983-84 (1999) (describing Netiquette).
66. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 Cornell L.

Rev. 531, 560 (2005) ("Public enforcement of property systems will ...often constitute a
public good. Enforcing property rights by monitoring infringements, apprehending
transgressors, and prosecuting and punishing violators has the effect of strengthening
property value.").
67. See David G. Post, What Larry Doesn't Get: Code, Law, and Liberty in Cyberspace,

52 Stan. L. Rev. 1439, 1440-42 (2000) (arguing for market responses to spam).
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development of mechanisms that can reduce the cost of achieving
communication, coordination, and commitment to support transactions on
the Internet."'68 In the spam context, for example, there are commercial
services that maintain a "blackhole" list of ISPs who send copious amounts
of spam, as well as filtering programs that users can install to regulate who
can send them email. But such solutions are proving to be imperfect at
best, with some suggesting that such techniques are actually blocking up to
thirty-five percent of legitimate email and only twenty-five percent of spam
messages. 6 9 After years of hesitating, in part because of claims that market
solutions could address the issue, Congress finally instituted a legal regime
to regulate spam-the CAN SPAM Act of 2003 7 0-although
its
effectiveness remains to be seen.
In order for market-based solutions to limit interference between uses of
commons access spectrum and render public regulation unnecessary, they
will need to prove more effective than their counterparts have in the battle
against spam (which is, admittedly, an imperfect analogy). At this point,
however, firms have only begun to develop such technologies, so it is too
early to tell how effective they will be in facilitating effective use of
commons access spectrum. Consider, for example, Propogate Network's
"swarm logic software," which enables different access points to
communicate with one another and to choose nonconflicting frequencies or
adjust their power levels to eliminate overlap. 7 1 If this technology were
able to reach a critical mass of adoption, even in localized areas, it could
conceivably minimize those transaction costs necessary to adapt to
neighboring uses of commons access spectrum. For neighboring buildings
with scores of Wi-Fi transmitters, such technologies could prove very
important, ensuring that different signals did not overlap and interfere with
each other-thereby slowing data transmission and possibly triggering the
destructive cycle of behavior noted above. Moreover, a logical extension of
the swarm logic software is a function that could enable neighbors to
identify those who deviated from accepted social norms in using commons
access spectrum and, concomitantly, lower enforcement costs. Indeed,
collective efforts-such as the Broadband Access Network Coordination
("BANC")-have already taken root to facilitate joint and controlled efforts
72
to limit interference.
Another marketplace response worth following is the effort by the Wi-Fi
Alliance to develop a community of equipment developers, service
providers, and users of commons access spectrum, all of whom would be
68. Gillian K. Hadfield, PrivatizingCommercialLaw: Lessons From ICANN, 6 J. Small
& Emerging Bus. L. 257, 287 (2002).
69. William G. Schwab, Take Back Your In Box, Experience, Winter 2004, at 14, 35.

70. 15 U.S.C.A. § 7701 (West 1998 & Supp. 2005).
71. See AutoCell Laboratories, http://www.propagatenetworks.com (last visited Sept. 7,

2005) (founded as Propagate Networks).
72. See Gerry Blackwell, BANC on Non-Interference, Wi-Fi Planet, Feb. 26, 2004,
http://www.wi-fiplanet.com/columns/article.php/1781_3318281_1;
Wireless BANC, supra

note 64.
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certified as good actors. As is the case with informational privacy for those
engaging in Internet commerce, members of this community have a stake in
building the confidence of the customers who use, or may use, equipment
or services that rely on commons access spectrum. In this case, the
initiative appears to stem (at least in part) from a dispute between two
companies, namely Broadcom's claim that certain products manufactured
73
by Atheros prevented Broadcom's own products from working properly.
To prevent similar future episodes, and to ensure that all companies that
produce Wi-Fi-related equipment do so in a manner that does not impede
the operation of equipment manufactured by other vendors, the Wi-Fi
Alliance has threatened to withhold or revoke the certification-and the
right to use its logo-from any offending companies. 74 At this point,
however, the Alliance has not begun policing such possible abuses, so it is
too early to quantify the impact of the revocation policy. Nonetheless, at
least based on the case of Internet privacy, the Alliance is likely to confront
a number of challenges-ranging from effective consumer education efforts
to reliable self-regulatory efforts-that will need to be addressed for this
75
initiative (or others like it) to be effective.
What remains to be seen, with respect to market-based responses to the
interference that results from the use of commons access spectrum, is
whether such measures will be able to overcome the distance and largenumber problems that often prevent social norms from addressing such
concerns effectively. To be sure, marketplace developments are likely to
enhance the abilities of parties who can easily contact-or at least are
reasonably proximate to-one another to work out mutually acceptable
arrangements. But where parties are not so easily identified, as in the
instance of spammers who easily hide from solutions aimed at limiting their
effectiveness, it is likely that any privately developed approaches will fall
short in preventing tragedy of the commons-type concerns. As in the spam
context, the difficulty related to addressing the behavior of bad actorswhether malicious or simply selfish-is that they are not interested in
cooperating with a collective solution that would be in the interests of the
entire community of users of commons access spectrum. This challenge is
exacerbated when there are disparate interests using disparate devices
operating disparate services.
C. Architecture
In analogizing the potential for commons access spectrum to succeed in a
manner similar to the Internet, many commons advocates have suggested
that technology-facilitating protocols, such as Wi-Fi, can be self-enforcing

73. Mark Hachman, Wi-Fi Group Cracks Down on Incompatible Extensions,
PCMag.com, July 19, 2004, http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,1759,1625097,00.asp.
74. Id.
75. Paul M. Schwartz, Beyond Lessig's Code for Internet Privacy: Cyberspace Filters,
Privacy Control,and FairInformation Practices,2000 Wis. L. Rev. 743, 766-69.
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in terms of their effectiveness in combating destructive behavior. 76 On this
argument, the network effects phenomenon-where certain technologies
become entrenched because they facilitate a wide variety of uses dependent
on them 77-- can ensure that a suite of protocols not only is adopted widely,
but also adhered to. The challenge in developing protocols that can limit
interfering uses is that engineers have proved ingenious in circumventing
all sorts of protocols that would otherwise limit behavior condemned by the
original inventor. 78 Moreover, this argument overlooks the fact that the
basic design ethos of the Internet is antithetical to limiting the potential uses
of basic enabling technologies. Rather, the Internet pioneers embraced an
"end-to-end" ethos that shifts control to the edges of the network precisely
so that users can introduce new innovations, regardless of their social
79
impact.
In short, the effectiveness of technical architecture in limiting interfering
uses of commons access spectrum depends on a regulatory regime that
requires all equipment to be certified as compliant with certain basic
protocols. The current certification regime, embodied in the FCC's Part 15
rules, safeguards only the rights of licensed spectrum users and provides no
protection to commons access users.80 Consider, for example, that a "Wi-Fi
Hog," which appropriated an unduly large amount of commons access
spectrum, undermining all Wi-Fi systems in a particular area but not
81
disrupting any licensed users, would satisfy Part 15's requirements.
Moreover, even if all developers of Wi-Fi transmitters agreed to certain
protocols to prevent destructive uses such as the Wi-Fi Hog, it would not be
difficult for skilled hackers to circumvent such limitations. Indeed, as
transmitters increasingly rely on software, the possibilities for "hardwiring" protections against noxious uses into the equipment itself will
quickly evaporate. 82 Consequently, without a back-end enforcement
76. See Buck, supra note 10,
88-94 (providing examples of effective cooperative selfenforcement among users of Wi-Fi technology).
77. See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence of
Network Externalities, 94 J. Pol. Econ. 822 (1986).
78. Consider, for example, the cases involving "hacking" and circumvention of copy
protection schemes. See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir.
2001).

79. Stated simply, the end-to-end ethos is a commitment to (1) openness (both in terms
of its basic standards and in the culture of the standard-setting organizations themselves), (2)
modularity and protocol layering, and (3) a shifting of control over the relevant applications
to the edge of the network. See Dale N. Hatfield, 8 Commlaw Conspectus 1, 1 (2000).
80. 47 C.F.R. § 15.5 (2004).
8 1. This Wi-Fi Hog is not a hypothetical device, but one that has already been invented.
See Wi-Fi-Hog-2003, http://www.mee.tcd.ie/-bruckerj/projects/wifihog.htm (last visited
Sept. 10, 2005).

82. The flexibility of software-defined radios built using open-source software will be
particularly amenable to modification-for good and for ill. See, e.g., Sam Williams, Radio
Free
Software,
Salon.com,
Dec.
18,
2002,
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2002/12/18/gnuradio/print.html

("We're

pretty much

turning all hardware problems into software problems [and] want to facilitate evolution in
the radio arena.") (quoting Eric Blossom, Founder of the GNU Radio Project).
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regime of some kind, the flexibility made possible by software-defined
radios may well increase the efficient use of spectrum while also facilitating
counterproductive uses.
D. Case Studies: The CB and Ham Radio Experiences
In arguing for a spectrum commons approach, a number of commentators
have suggested that past experiences with commons access spectrum, in the
contexts of ham radio and citizen's band radio, underscore that the forces
discussed above-i.e., social norms, marketplace responses, and technical
architecture-can limit the potential for destructive behavior. In particular,
Stuart Buck and Professors Carol Ting, Johannes M. Bauer, and Steven S.
Wildman make this very argument. 83 As we discuss below, however, their
accounts of these episodes minimize the degree to which tragedy of the
commons-type behavior took place in the absence of governmental
regulation and fail to appreciate the unique circumstances that made
cooperation possible in those instances.
1. Ham Radio
In arguing for an increased reliance on the commons model, Stuart Buck
invokes the example of ham radio-or more precisely, the development of
84
similar commons-type practices at the dawn of ham radio's development.
In the ham radio environment, volunteer leaders have taken on the role of
policing the use of the spectrum. In many parts of the country, voluntary
"spectrum management leaders," who call themselves the amateur auxiliary
of the FCC, are able to police illegal conduct somewhat effectively by using
threats-in the form of official-looking notifications-that they will spur
FCC action to go after bad actors who fail to heed their warnings. 85 This
peer pressure is taken seriously by ham operators-when the observer
notifies another operator that he or she has been operating in a manner not
in accordance with the rules, it generally triggers the desired response. 86 In
addition to the official observers who work in conjunction with the FCC, a
distinct group of frequency coordinators oversees the use of repeaters in
87
ham radio transmissions, facilitating coordination between different users.
In highlighting the case of ham radio, Stuart Buck acknowledges that it
demonstrates how, under certain conditions, social norms and private

83. See generally Buck, supra note 10,
40-42; Carol Ting et al., The U.S. Experience
with Non-traditionalApproaches to Spectrum Management: Tragedies of the Commons and
Other Myths Reconsidered, Sept. 2003, http://quello.msu.edu/wp/wp-03-05.pdf.
84. Buck, supra note 10,
78-80.
85. See Dave Hassler, Observing the Official Observers, QST Magazine, July 2003, at 1,
available at http://www.arrl.org/qst/2003/07/0307047.pdf, see also American Radio Relay
League,
The
Amateur
Auxiliary
of
the
FCC,
http://www.arrl.org/FandES/field/org/anaux.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2005).
86. See Hasler, supra note 85, at 1-3. (describing positive responses).

87. Id.
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enforcement can obviate the need for public enforcement. 88 Indeed, the
FCC's decision to ban the sale of amplifiers separate from radio
transmission devices89 underscores the fragility of commons access
spectrum environments protected. only by social norms and private
oversight. Moreover, the rise and fall of CB radio makes this point even
more powerfully.
2. The CB Radio Saga
In the mid-1970s, CB radios experienced a brief period popularity with
the general public. Prior to that time, the band was used largely by distinct
communities of enthusiasts and, more famously, by truckers (think "10-4,
good buddy"). Once the band became more widely used, and attracted a
more diverse community of users, the previous social norms broke down
(including the commitment to refrain from vulgar language and harassment)
and users began, among other things, attaching amplifiers to their
transmitters to make themselves, in effect, broadcasters. The mutated
character of the previously informal communications soon boomeranged,
ending the brief explosion of popularity for CB radios once new users
discovered that the advertised attractiveness of informal communication
among enthusiasts no longer existed.
Commentators Ting, Bauer, and Wildman have a different take on the
rise and fall of CB radio. Rather than suggest that the overuse of the band
and the rise of amplifiers confirm concerns about tragedy of the commonslike results, they argue that the relative success and workability of the band
before and after its rise in popularity actually undermines the case for
tragedy of the commons-type concerns. As they put it, "Interference caused
by illegally amplified signals has always been and still is a common
complaint [among CB users], but unlike during its peak, channel congestion
is not a problem anymore, even in metropolitan areas." 90 Notably, these
commentators acknowledge the FCC's failings in this area, explaining that
it "has never devoted sufficient resources to enforcement to ensure deter
[sic] violations of its usage rules or violations of its technical
specifications." 9 1
The lack of effective enforcement by the FCC undoubtedly contributed to
the rising complaints about interference during CB radio's peak years of
1974-1976 and the dramatic falloff in users after that time frame: In fact,
the number of complaints escalated from 30,000 to 100,000 during that
time. 92 Ting, Bauer, and Wildman have suggested that the misbehavior was
confined to a small subset of users who, in violation of the rules of the

88. See id.
89. Modification of Parts 2 and 15 of the Commission's Rules for Unlicensed Devices
and Equipment Approval, 19 F.C.C.R. 13,539, 13,545-46 (2004).
90. Ting et al., supra note 83, at 6.
91. Id. at 12.
92. Id. at 17.
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band, acted as broadcasters rather than individual communicators. 93 Even
assuming the validity of this argument, it supports the game theory
prediction that outside entrants into a community who face neither social
norm pressures nor legal enforcement will be likely to engage in disruptive
94
behavior that will limit the potential of a common resource.
Consequently, if the story of CB radio's rise and fall were to be repeated in
the case of WISPs, the FCC's effort to promote WISPs would almost
certainly fail.
III. PUBLIC REGULATION AND MOVING BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL
PART 15 REGIME

As Part II explained, nonpublic regulation is unlikely to be fully effective
in guarding against tragedy of the commons-type concerns. 95 In terms of
the role of social norms, we believe that they are quite promising, but that
they will be of limited effectiveness in addressing relations between distant
and anonymous users of commons access spectrum. As for market forces,
there are strong reasons to question their effectiveness insofar as they will
likely operate in both directions-not only protecting cooperative behavior,
but also creating incentives for "cheating." Finally, as to the effect of
specific technical architectures, the increased uses of software-defined
radios will facilitate the (already possible) circumvention of prescribed
protocols, making it important to oversee the behavior of individual users.
In short, the success of the commons model is likely to depend, at least in
part, on the ability of regulation to guard against the tragedy of the
commons and counterproductive uses of commons access spectrum.
While nonlegal regulation forces are unlikely to be fully effective in
addressing tragedy of the commons-like concerns, the future role of social
norms, marketplace responses, and technical architectures is likely to
93. Id.
94. The FCC adopted the broader explanation of congestion-i.e., without assigning
blame to a limited class of users-in evaluating the unfortunate fate of CB radio. See
Creation of an Additional Personal Radio Service, 72 F.C.C.2d 453, 455 (1979) (notice of
inquiry) (noting "complaints that the level of congestion (at least in major urban areas) has
reached the point where reliable communications are becoming increasingly difficult to
achieve").
95. In evaluating the effectiveness of nonpublic regulatory approaches, we have declined
to evaluate whether they are open to criticism on other grounds, such as being an illegitimate
or an undemocratic means of developing information policy. Such arguments, for example,
are commonly leveled at the Internet Corporation for Assigned Numbers and Names
("ICANN"), which is a private, nonprofit corporation that manages access to the Internet's
domain name system. See, e.g., Jonathan Weinberg, ICANN and the Problem of Legitimacy,
50 Duke L.J. 187 (2000); see also Steven L. Schwarcz, Private Ordering,97 Nw. U. L. Rev.
319, 322, 329 (2002) (observing that "commercial private ordering is rarely restricted" by
traditional safeguards that confer legitimacy on public bodies, but that "[w]here efficiency is
the sole goal of regulation, unrestricted private ordering can be legitimate"). But see
Jonathan R. Macey, Public and Private Ordering and the Production of Legitimate and

Illegitimate Legal Rules, 82 Cornell L. Rev. 1123, 1125 (1997) (suggesting that private
ordering is more likely to produce legitimate rules and thus should be preferred over public
ordering).

FORDHAMLA W REVIEW

[Vol. 74

remain important. Nonetheless, on their own and without the backstop of
law enforcement, they are unlikely to address such concerns effectively. To
be sure, even without law enforcement assistance, it is quite possible that
commons access spectrum could still be used effectively. But as rival
commercial services utilize commons access spectrum and the distance of
uses for commons access spectrum continues to expand-the record for a
Wi-Fi transmission is already in excess of fifty-five miles 96-the need for
public regulation is likely to become more pronounced. Indeed, the FCC
appears to recognize the need to act in this area, as evidenced by Chairman
Powell's remark that such regulations are necessary to "protect against [an]
interference meltdown," 9 7 such as that caused by tragedy of the commonslike concerns.
The FCC, in developing its regulatory regime for commons access
spectrum, should recognize the importance of these non-regulatory
protections against interference, work in tandem with them where possible,
and be sure not to displace them. Significantly, there is a risk that external
rules and monitoring by the FCC could, if not carefully developed, prove
counterproductive by crowding out constructive cooperative initiatives such
as those discussed above. 98 In general, the FCC's regulatory tools for
ensuring cooperation in the use of commons access spectrum fall into two
categories: proactive requirements and reactive enforcement measures.
Before discussing these options, however, we will first address two
proposals for taking the job of enforcement responsibility away from the
FCC, explaining how each proposal deviates from existing law and why we
view these proposals to be inferior to a regulatory regime superintended by
the FCC.
A. Alternatives to FCC Regulation
Two notable proposals provide alternatives to the FCC's role of
overseeing the use of commons access spectrum. One proposal, which
draws its inspiration from the property rights model, would be to allow
either local property owners or those who aggregate such rights to police
the use of commons access spectrum. A second proposal would be to treat
abusive uses of commons access spectrum as common law violations to be
addressed in judicial forums.
Increasingly, rival users of commons access spectrum are looking to
different authorities to settle disputes between them. If, for example, rival
services using commons access spectrum at airports bring complaints to the
airport authority, that authority will be tempted to adjudicate such disputes
and regulate commons access spectrum use at airports just as that authority
96. Kim Zetter, Wi-Fi Shootout in the Desert, Wired, Aug. 3, 2004, available at
http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0, 1284,64440,00.html.
97. Powell Tells CES FCC Must Understand and Protect VoIP This Year, Comms.
Daily, Jan. 12, 2004, at 2, available at 2004 WLNR 6932914 (internal quotation omitted).
98. See Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. of
Econ. Persps. 137, 147 (2000) (reporting on experiments that demonstrate this possibility).
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regulates disputes among other other concessions. Similarly, if a user is
unable to use her device at home because a neighbor's device is
incompatible-and they are unable to resolve their dispute amicably-the
frustrated user might be tempted to bring an action in court claiming that
her neighbor's use of commons access spectrum constitutes a "nuisance"
that should be enjoined. In either case, however, the airport authority or the
court would lack jurisdiction over the dispute, as the Communications Act
clearly assigns such matters to the FCC. 99
As a legal matter, it is generally accepted that the FCC enjoys exclusive
authority over spectrum matters. 1 0 In particular, the courts have regularly
concluded that the FCC's authority in this area preempts the entire field of
possible regulation. 10 1 In so doing, courts have cited the relevant legislative
history of Congress's last enactment that addressed the FCC's jurisdiction
in this area (i.e., the House Conference Report of the Communications
Amendments Act of 1982), 102 which explained that "exclusive jurisdiction
over [radio frequency interference] incidents (including pre-emption of state
10 3
and local regulation of such phenomena) lies with the FCC."'
Consequently, when individuals have brought actions claiming that a
particular operator's transmissions interfered with their home appliances
and thus constituted a nuisance, the courts have declined to hear such
cases. 104

As a normative matter, some argue that Congress should address the
FCC's stranglehold on spectrum as soon as possible. 10 5 To be sure, the
FCC's management of spectrum has been and continues to be highly
99. See Petition of Cingular Wireless L.L.C. for a Declaratory Ruling, 18 F.C.C.R.
13,126, 13,132 (2003) ("The Commission and the federal courts have consistently found that
the Commission's authority in the area of [radio frequency interference] is exclusive and any
attempt by State or local governments to regulate in the area of [radio frequency
interference] is preempted.").
100. We say "generally accepted" because, although the Supreme Court has not addressed
the matter, all federal courts of appeals that have considered the matter have agreed that the
FCC enjoys complete authority in this area. See, e.g., Freeman v. Burlington Broadcasters,
Inc., 204 F.3d 311, 320 (2d Cir. 2000) (reviewing authority and concluding "that federal law
has preempted the field of [radio frequency] interference regulation").
101. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (holding that field
preemption is appropriate when the federal regulatory regime is "so pervasive" and the
federal interest "so dominant" as to leave no room for state regulation).
102. See, e.g., Burlington Broadcasters,Inc., 204 F.3d at 321.
103. H.R. Rep. No. 97-765, at 23 (1982) (Conf. Rep.), as reprintedin 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2261, 2267; see also id. at 33, 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2277 ("[T]he Conferees intend that
regulation of [radio frequency interference] phenomena shall be imposed only by the
Commission.").
104. See, e.g., Broyde v. Gotham Tower, Inc., 13 F.3d 994, 996 (6th Cir. 1994) (ruling
that a nuisance action, based upon allegations that radio signals exceeded federal standards,
could not be brought in federal or state court, and noting that all courts to consider the matter
have so held).
105. See, e.g., Pablo T.Spiller & Carlo Cardilli, Towards a Property Rights Approach to
Communications Spectrum, 16 Yale J. on Reg. 53, 81, 82 (1999) (asserting that "the FCC
has shied away from any large-scale revision of the existing spectrum administration to a
property rights approach" and that "the adoption of a property rights approach to spectrum in
the U.S. could only be accomplished by an Act of Congress").
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imperfect, but we are even less sanguine about a model of purely private
ordering or common law development.
In terms of private ordering, while the airport authority case is one of the
more plausible contexts in which a band manager could ensure some level
of cooperation over a broader geographic area, even that environment is
plagued by the risk of leaving the oversight of commons access spectrum to
local landowners.
In particular, airport authorities may view their
managerial role as an opportunity to collect rents from those wishing to
operate Wi-Fi-like services.
Reflecting this concern, the Industrial
Telecommunications Association urged the FCC to reject a petition by
airport authorities to oversee such spectrum, explaining that "the 'sole
'10 6
motivational goal' of those efforts 'is to increase airport revenue." '
Consistent with a long line of precedent, the FCC staff accepted this
argument and retained exclusive
jurisdiction over commons access
07
spectrum within airport terminals. 1
To their credit, the ability of airport authorities to coordinate effectively
commons access spectrum uses makes their claim to oversight more
compelling than an argument that individuals should be afforded oversight
over commons access spectrum on the real estate they own. In particular,
for a would-be WISP, such a regime would force it to acquire easements
from all in a neighborhood before providing service to any customer. Such
a requirement would not only create enormous transaction costs, it would
also invite hold-out behavior-i.e., seeking the financial rewards of being
the last property owner to grant an easement-because it is not possible for
WISPs to prevent a signal from trespassing on a non-consenting property
owner's domain. To be sure, if one believed that commons access spectrum
could only be used in the home or in very limited geographic areas, this
proposal might have some merit, but the increasing distances that can be
reached using present technology suggest otherwise.
The second alternative to the FCC is common law courts. Kevin
Werbach recently advanced a version of an argument previously promoted
by Peter Huber, arguing that common law courts can oversee access to
spectrum. 10 8 Huber maintained that courts can enforce property rights to
106. Bob Brewin, Airlines Win Wi-Fi Management Battle with Airports, Computerworld,

June
25,
2004,
http://www.computerworld.com/mobiletopics/mobile/wifiL/story/
0,10801,94124,00.html (quoting the Industrial Telecommunications Association).
107. Federal Commc'ns Comm'n, Commission Staff Clarifies FCC's Role Regarding
Radio Interference Matters and Its Rules Governing Customer Antennas and Other
Unlicensed Equipment, June 24, 2004, at 1 (public notice), available at

http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/DA-04-1844A1.pdf ("[T]he FCC has
exclusive authority to resolve matters involving radio frequency interference [RFI] when
unlicensed devices are being used, regardless of venue."); id at 2 ("We also affirm that the
consumer protections for the installation and use of consumer antennas under the FCC's
Over-the-Air Reception Devices (OTARD) rules apply to unlicensed devices.").
108. See Peter W. Huber, Law and Disorder in Cyberspace: Abolish the FCC and Let
Common Law Rule the Telecosm 206 (1997) (asserting that "[slmall-scale and privatelycentered common law is the only kind of law that sits comfortably with our traditions of
individual freedom and private liberty" and that, under such common-law governance, "the
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use spectrum, 10 9 and somewhat similarly, Werbach has argued that courts
can ensure that individuals and firms use commons access spectrum without
unduly interfering with one another. 1 0 The essence of Huber's argument,
and presumably Werbach's as well, is that the FCC is unable to manage
questions of spectrum interference effectively. To Huber, such authority
invites micromanaging by the FCC-an "army of federal employees
hanging around indefinitely to meddle and mess up" the industry."I '
The courts that have resolved private actions have recognized that the
issues involved in spectrum management are highly technical and require
uniform, national rules. 1 2 After all, equipment manufacturers and service
providers rely on pre-set rules to develop their offerings and would confront
considerable uncertainty if the developers were left to defend themselves in
unpredictable forums. In short, the court system's expertise and ability to
develop determinate rules is inferior to that of the FCC. 1 3 Finally, to the
extent that the FCC makes substantive misjudgments in this area, we view
this as an argument for better regulatory strategies, not for different
institutional actors.
Even if courts could develop more determinate and expertly guided rules
4
for spectrum policy (say, as the Federal Circuit has for patent policy),"1
there are two other notable reasons to opt for a model of public regulatory
enforcement. First, as we will discuss below, the FCC enjoys the ability to
work in tandem with other stakeholders and to develop proactive
approaches in ways that courts cannot. Second, the ability of private actors
to remedy nuisance-like violations is notoriously limited, as they must
internalize the relevant enforcement costs. To be sure, there are solutions to
this dilemma-including class actions or public prosecutors-but one
effective mechanism of addressing this issue is to authorize agency

telecosm will become again a place of vast freedom and abundance"); Werbach, supra note
12, 920-21 ("Common law doctrines of nuisance and trespass may be used to resolve
[spectrum interference] disputes.").
109. See Huber, supra note 108, at 72-74 (advocating the privatization of the spectrum
and asserting that courts could adjudicate disputes involving interference between spectrum
users).
110. See Werbach, supra note 12, at 956 (advocating a "deregulation of spectrum" that
"puts decisions about who can transmit in the hands of those who wish to transmit and
makes use of the private mechanism of common law courts to sort out disputes").
111. Peter Huber et al., Federal Telecommunications Law 402-03 (2d ed. 1999).
112. See, e.g., Broyde v. Gotham Tower, Inc., 13 F.3d 994, 997 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting

that the FCC's jurisdiction "'over technical matters associated with the transmission of radio
signals 'is clearly exclusive"' (quoting Head v. N.M. Bd. Of Exam'rs in Optometry, 374

U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1963))).
113. See Digital Crossroads, supra note 21, at 421 (noting that a court that "finds fault
with an agency's decision is expected to remand the matter back to the agency" because
"agencies have greater topical expertise than judges"); Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common
Law, Cooperative Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev.
1692, 1715-18 (2001).
114. See generally Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in
Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1 (1989).
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oversight, as the Federal Trade Commission does for consumer protection
issues.
B. ProactiveRequirements Superintended by the FCC
In regulating commons access spectrum, the FCC's regime centers on
enforcing a set of certification requirements that restrict power levels and
guard against interference with licensed operators. As the role of commons
access spectrum within the economy increases, and as it is used to provide
carrier-level services, the FCC will face increasing pressure to develop
measures that will limit interference between rival users of commons access
spectrum. Building from the Part 15 rules certification regime, the FCC is
beginning to experiment with two notable, proactive requirements: (1) the
imposition of spectrum etiquette rules, and (2) database registration
requirements. We will discuss each in turn.
1. Etiquette Standards
The FCC first experimented with the use of a prescribed etiquette
standard for equipment using commons access spectrum when it established
the rules for unlicensed Personal Communications Services ("PCS")
spectrum in the early 1990s. In that case, the FCC mandated all unlicensed
PCS equipment to "monitor the spectrum before transmitting and to use a
specific transmission format"' I5-i.e., such devices must "listen before they
talk." Later, after the American National Standards Institute ("ANSI")
developed a measurement procedure to ensure that manufacturers complied
with such requirements, the FCC incorporated this procedure into its
rules. 116
As commons access spectrum applications have proliferated, the FCC
has begun to consider whether it should mandate spectrum etiquette more
broadly. In particular, in considering how it can reform its rules governing
commons access spectrum to facilitate wireless broadband, the FCC asked
whether it should impose certain etiquette standards.
In response,
Microsoft advocated a set of etiquette standards-including listening before
talking, ceasing "transmissions if there is no information to be sent," and
using "the minimum transmit power necessary to complete a
communications link"1 17-on all uses of commons access spectrum in order
to limit interference. To date, Microsoft's proposal has proved quite
controversial, with a number of commentators arguing that those bands
already replete with commons access uses (such as the 2.4 GHz band)
115. Review of Part 15, 16 F.C.C.R. 18,205, 18,216 (2001) (notice of proposed
rulemaking and order).

116. Review of Part 15 and Other Parts of the Commission's Rules, 18 F.C.C.R. 14,741,

14,781 (2003) (second report and order).

117. See Modification of Parts 2 and 15 of the Commission's Rules for Unlicensed

Devices and Equipment Approval, 19 F.C.C.R. 13,539, 13,552 (2004) (describing
Microsoft's proposal); see also Comments of Microsoft, supra note 14.
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would incur great costs associated with these requirements. The FCC has
acknowledged such concerns and declined to implement any such proposal;
in so doing, however, it suggested that such a proposal had merit for bands
and indicated that it would
yet to be dedicated to commons access uses
118
seriously consider the concept in the future.
With respect to new bands, the primary concern related to spectrum
etiquette requirements is that compliance with a particular standard will
limit innovation. In short, detailed restrictions-no matter how well
intended or well crafted-can reduce the ability of the inventors and others
to innovate without seeking changes in the associated rules and regulations.
Moreover, regulatory standards are sometimes flawed, either because the
regulator lacks necessary technical capabilities or because the regulator
succumbs to the pressures of particular groups' efforts to protect their
market position through regulation (i.e., rent-seeking behavior)., 19
Even giving the regulators any benefit of the doubt, whether to develop
mandated etiquette standards is a difficult question. Certainly, more
restrictive requirements-which could limit the ability of innovators to use
licensed spectrum quickly and effectively-may well sacrifice long-term
innovation in favor of short-term utilization. Indeed, the codification of
certain etiquette standards for commons access spectrum could undermine
the freewheeling innovation traditionally associated with such bands. To
strike a balance between these two goals, we recommend preserving certain
bands of spectrum for more wide-ranging uses while experimenting with
etiquette standards in other bands. In particular, we believe that it would be
a mistake to impose "listen before you talk" (and other spectrum etiquette)
requirements on all bands, but such measures clearly have merit insofar as
they can enable WISPs to provide levels of service quality associated with
carrier-class service.
For the FCC, the challenges associated with standard setting (including
those associated with setting etiquette standards) are not novel concerns, as
they have arisen in the transition to digital television (among other such
initiatives). 120 In setting telecommunications standards, the FCC should be
careful to institute only functional requirements and, where possible, to
utilize the experience of established standard-setting bodies to define and
enforce the relevant criteria. Notably, the FCC's standard-setting oversight
has moved in this direction both in superintending aspects of the transition
to digital television and in other areas as well, such as the enforcement of its
Part 68 Rules that govern what equipment may be attached to the telephone
network. 12 1

118. Modification of Parts 2 and 15 of the Commission's Rules for Unlicensed Devices
and Equipment Approval, 19 F.C.C.R. at 13,552.
119. For a good discussion of this point, see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of
Property andAntiproperty, 102 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 43-44 (2003).
120. For a discussion of that challenge, see Digital Crossroads, supra note 21, at 395-406.
121. For a fuller explication of this point, see id. at 385-406.
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If managed optimally, the FCC's use of standard-setting bodies to
develop the necessary etiquette standards can leverage the expertise of such
standard-setting bodies as well as maintain a degree of oversight to be sure
that such standards are adopted. By contrast, where standard-setting bodies
are left to their own devices, their lack of formal authority may lead to a
failure to adopt, or an inability to enforce, compliance with a particular
standard. 122 Significantly, the FCC is also in a position to ensure that
standard-setting bodies develop standards based on a fair process that
provides a collective benefit that would not be internalized fully by any
23
individual user of spectrum. 1
In a recent decision involving the allocation of unlicensed spectrum, the
FCC both recognized the need to resist developing a standard itself and
declined to empower the efforts of a particular standards body (e.g., the
IEEE) to develop a protocol for avoiding interference in the use of
unlicensed spectrum. 124 Presumably, this decision reflects the concern that
developing and enforcing proactive requirements embodied in spectrum
etiquette rules might, if managed ineffectively, replicate the failings of the
command-and-control model-i.e., rigidity, inflexibility to change, and
invitations to rent-seeking behavior. Nonetheless, by calling for the
creation of a protocol (or set of protocols) to limit interference, but'
suggesting that it is not regulating the use of the relevant bands of
unlicensed spectrum, it risks promoting confusion rather than the
development of the WISPs.
2. Registration Requirements
Over the last twenty years, the FCC has increasingly moved away from
the laissez-faire Part 15 regime, and instead has begun to adopt limitations
that increase confidence that devices using commons access spectrum will
not interfere with licensed uses and, in some cases, commons access uses.
In addition to the development of etiquette rules, another innovation is the
requirement that anyone interested in using a particular band register their
commitment to do s0. 125 In substance, this regime imposes a nonexclusive
licensing requirement that all users provide certain information before using
the designated spectrum. In the so-called "millimeter wave" proceeding,
for example, the FCC adopted such a requirement, instituting a site-specific
coordination and registration process to be superintended by a third party
entity serving as a clearinghouse for access to this spectrum. 126 Similarly,
122. For a discussion of this model of standards development, see Philip J. Weiser,
Internet Governance,Standard Setting, andSelf-Regulation, 28 N. Ky. L. Rev. 822 (2001).
123. See Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, andIntellectual PropertyPolicy, 103

Colum. L. Rev. 534, 573-75 (2003).
124. Wireless Operations in the 3650-3700 MHz Band, 20 F.C.C.R. 6502, 6522-23
(2005).

125. See Allocations and Service Rules for the 71-76 GHz, 81-86 GHz and 92-95 GHz
Bands, 18 F.C.C.R. 23,318, 23,339-41 (2003).

126. See id.
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in its specialized Part 15 rules for broadband over powerline ("BPL")
services, the FCC mandated that all BPL providers use a publicly available
database to indicate their operations in particular areas. 127 In theory, such a
notification and registration regime facilitates cooperation and creates
incentives for good behavior (as well as a greater ability to use the stick of
legal enforcement to punish bad behavior).
The use of a registration regime for a spectrum commons raises a host of
issues that the FCC will need to consider carefully in the years ahead. In
discussing a registration regime, for example, the cautionary tale of Internet
Corporation for Assigned Numbers and Names ("ICANN") immediately
comes to mind. In that case, a government-sponsored-but not regulatedentity gained control over the important role of overseeing domain
names. 128 The registration regime envisioned by the FCC, however, would
not cover access to all spectrum, but instead would be similar to a stock
exchange's role in facilitating capital formation and thus unlike ICANN's
exclusive role vis-d-vis domain names. In this sense, the FCC could
facilitate competition between registrars and oversee registrars in a manner
similar to how the Securities and Exchange Commission oversees the stock
exchanges. Of course, as observers of the recent wave of scandals are
aware, that model is not without cautionary tales either, as it can, for
example, enable the registrar to limit competition or extract rents that raise
the price paid by end users.
C. Reactive Measures Superintendedby the FCC
While the proactive measures discussed above are more recent
innovations, the FCC's traditional enforcement efforts related to commons
access spectrum have involved the reactive role of ensuring compliance
with the Part 15 certification requirements. 129 As noted above, however,
there are many scenarios-ranging from incompatible equipment to a WiFi-Hog to intentional jamming-that can compromise the use of commons
access spectrum. In part, Wi-Fi's open standard leaves it vulnerable to
hacking of all kinds, including intentional jamming using off-the-shelf
equipment. 130 Indeed, even certified equipment can easily be used-either
unintentionally (e.g., hogging) or intentionally (e.g., jamming)-to disturb
adjacent commons access spectrum uses. Although the FCC's Chief
Engineer has indicated that the agency intends to "get serious about
127. Amendment of Part 15 Regarding New Requirements and Measurement Guidelines
for Access Broadband over Power Line Systems, 19 F.C.C.R. 21,265, 21,300-01 (2004).
128. Among other things, ICANN's status as a government-sponsored, but not regulated,
registrar gives rise to a series of nettlesome issues. See Milton Mueller, Ruling the Root 21126 (2002); Jonathan Zittrain, What's in a Name, 55 Fed. Comm. L.J. 153, 153-54 (2003)

(reviewing Milton Mueller, supr 7).
129. See, e.g., Datel Design & Dev., Inc., 19 F.C.C.R. 17, 20 (2004) (notice of apparent

liability) (fining Datel Design and Development $10,000 for importing equipment that
radiated emissions beyond that authorized by the Part 15 rules).
130. See Patrick Gray, New Flaw Takes Wi-Fi off the Air, The Register, May 13, 2004,

http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/05/13/wifisecurityflaw.
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unauthorized use" of commons access spectrum and will "go after abusers
of unlicensed spectrum," 13 1 neither its relevant rules nor its enforcement
apparatus are set up to do this job. In fact, an agency spokesman indicated
that the agency has never fined a party for using cellphone-jamming
equipment, and industry executives
suggest that the rules against jamming
32
are essentially unenforced. 1
Under its broad enabling authority, the FCC is free to regulate behavior
between users of commons access spectrum. The FCC could, for example,
begin enforcing certain broad standards-such as "no willful and malicious
interference"--or specific rules (like etiquette standards). To do so, it
would use its authority under the Communications Act to "govern[] the
interference potential of devices" using radio frequencies. 133 More
particularly, the FCC could apply to the commons access spectrum the
Communications Act command that "[n]o person shall willfully or
maliciously interfere with or cause interference to any radio
134
communications of any station licensed or authorized" by the FCC.
However, construing users of commons access spectrum as authorized
operators and enforcing this command effectively-something the FCC has
yet to do-presents the agency with a number of challenges.
For a number of reasons, the devices utilizing commons access spectrum
are fundamentally different than their licensed spectrum counterparts,
making enforcement efforts measurably more difficult. First, the sheer
number of devices involved and the decentralized nature of the networks
make it difficult to carry out enforcement activities. Thus, like the issues
related to digital content distributed illegally via the Internet, it will often be
difficult for enforcement authorities (either public agencies or private
actors) to track down relevant violators and then demonstrate their violation
of the relevant requirements. 135 Second, unlike the audible or visible forms
of interference associated with traditional radio and television broadcasting,
interference in a data network may only appear through a slower or more
erratic performance, often making the source of the degradation difficult to
ascertain. For example, slower data downloads might be caused by a
legally operated, proximately located cordless telephone or an illegal data
network device operating at high power a kilometer away. Third,
distinguishing between levels of intent-e.g., between benign hogging on
account of inferior equipment and malevolent jamming-will not always be

131. OET Chief Sees Potential Solutionfor "White Spaces" TV Proposal,Comms. Daily,

Apr. 19, 2004, at 2, 3, available at 2004 WLNR 6952149 (internal quotation omitted); see
also Powell, supra note 6, at 4 ("[W]e are fully committed to enforcing our technical
rules.").
132. Christopher Elliot, Mystery of the Cellphone that Doesn't Work at the Hotel, N.Y.

Times, Sept. 7, 2004, at C8.
133. 47 U.S.C. § 302a (2000).
134. Id. § 333.
135. See, e.g., Recording Indus. Ass'n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., 351 F.3d 1229
(D.C. Cir. 2003).
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easy, let alone demonstrable for enforcement purposes. 136 Finally, to
engage in effective enforcement efforts, the FCC-possibly in conjunction
with other actors-will need to invest in monitoring equipment and also be
sufficiently effective to create real deterrent effects. In short, the failure of
the FCC to pursue effective enforcement methods can contribute to the
illegal uses,
or even the failure, of a service, as in the case of the CB
137
radio.
As the FCC considers how to prevent certain uses of commons access
spectrum, it is critical that it enlist good actors in local communities to
assist their efforts. In so doing, it can follow the model used in the ham
radio environment, discussed above, in which the FCC empowers voluntary
overseers by providing an enforcement threat to their exercise of unofficial
authority. 13 8 Indeed, the model of empowering private individuals to work
together to solve disputes is one the FCC has employed in other contexts.
In particular, Part 101139 of the FCC's rules facilitates cooperation among
users of licensed spectrum by specifying that they work together to
coordinate their use of a set of frequencies-i.e., to establish operating
procedures for those using the same spectrum. 140 In effect, the Part 101
rules empower private frequency coordinators to settle disputes privately by
insisting that the relevant parties work through issues cooperatively prior to
FCC involvement.' 4 1
Significantly, this regime has spurred the
establishment of cooperative institutions that self enforce-through the
existence of an institutional memory and a market for reputation-measures
that require actors to act reasonably over time. 142 In short, this regime
reflects a proper balance of public regulation and private ordering,
facilitating private cooperation in order to ensure that a common resource is
43
protected and used appropriately.

136. This challenge relates more generally to the difficulties associated with defining
"harmful interference." See R. Paul Margie, Can You Hear Me Now? Getter Better
Reception from the FCC's Spectrum Policy, 2003 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 5,
http://stlr.stanford.edu/STLR/Articles/03_STLR_5/index.htm.

137. See discussion supra Part II.D.2.
138. See FCCOfficial Acknowledges OOs Really Are "Official, " The AARL Letter Online
(American Radio Relay League), April 9, 1999, http://www.arrl.org/ arrlletter/99/0409/

(quoting an FCC official as stating that "[t]he volunteer work of these Official Observers is a
critical element of the Commission's enforcement program").
139. 47 C.F.R. § 101 (2004).
140. See generally Reorganization and Revision of Parts 1, 2, 21, and 94 of the Rules to
Establish New Part 101 Governing Terrestrial Microwave Fixed Radio Services, 11 F.C.C.R.
13,449 (1996).
141. Schroeder Manatee Ranch, 16 F.C.C.R. 5722, 5723 (2001) (noting that, under the
relevant FCC rules, licensees "are expected to cooperate in the use of frequencies and
resolve any harmful interference by mutually satisfactory arrangements" (internal quotation
and footnote omitted)).
142. For an example of an association that facilitates reputational sanctions, see Lisa
Bernstein, Private Commerical Law in the Cotton Industry: CreatingCooperation Through
Rules, Norms, and Institutions,99 Mich. L. Rev. 1724 (2001).

143. See Ostrom, supra note 63, at 138-39 (detailing how a collective institution for water
management arose).
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To enforce proactive requirements and oversee malicious uses of
spectrum, the FCC should enhance its spectrum enforcement capabilities as
well as empower other entities to do so. 144 In particular, standard-setting
bodies, frequency coordinators, and the volunteer coordinators in the ham
radio environment all provide models that the FCC can employ in
developing a regulatory regime to govern commons access spectrum. With
respect to selecting entities that can aid its enforcement efforts, the FCC can
rely on existing institutions (e.g., the IEEE as a competent standard-setting
body) and allow social norm entrepreneurs to emerge and be embraced by a
relevant community (as has occurred in the ham radio environment).
Finally, the FCC can consider delegating responsibility to registrars or band
managers who would be accountable to it. Given the FCC's minimal
experience with all of these approaches, it would do best to use a
combination of all models before emphasizing a particular strategy.
CONCLUSION

As the FCC builds on the initial, unexpected success of the commons
access model of spectrum management, it should consider carefully what
measures will guard against tragedy of the commons-like concerns. In a
technologically dynamic environment, there are numerous challenges that
the FCC will face in developing an effective model for reliable
enforcement. As this Article has discussed, no one single approach-and
particularly no approach that does not involve FCC oversight-is likely to
be successful. Consequently, the FCC should continue moving ahead to
implement different proactive and reactive measures that will provide users
of commons access spectrum with important assurances that new services
and products will not be compromised either by bad actors or poor
coordination. If the FCC fails to do so, however, it risks allowing the
promise of WISP-like services to follow the unfortunate boom-and-bust
path of CB radio.

144. Stuart Buck argues for a spectrum commons with rules enforced by local
management associations. See Buck, supra note 10, 76. While we believe that such an
approach must be coupled with other measures as well, both his argument and our
endorsement of such a point appreciate that there are considerable benefits to relying on
subsidiary entities to enforce basic standards announced by the FCC. See Weiser, supra note
113, at 1698-1703.

